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ABSTRACT 
The tax smoothing theory is examined for Canada and the United States. A distinction is made 
between federal and local levels of government. Mobility of taxable resources at the state and 
local levels may constrain the ability of these governments to smooth tax rates. Testing is 
undertaken in the frequency domain to see if the cumulated periodogram of the first differenced 
tax rate series differs from white noise. Testing is undertaken with and without correction for 
time averaging. Results generally support tax smoothing by both federal governments and the 
Canadian provinces. Tax smoothing is rejected for state and local governments. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study examines the tax-smoothing hypothesis in Canada and the 
United States at both federal and local levels of government. Tax smoothing 
implies that the tax rate behaves as a random walk. Testing is undertaken in 
the frequency domain to see if the cumulated periodogram of the first differenced 
tax rate series differs from white noise. The methodology was suggested 
in Bizer and Durlauf (1990). Testing is undertaken with and without 
correction for time averaging. Results generally support tax smoothing by 
both federal governments and the Canadian provinces. Tax smoothing is 
rejected for state and local governments. Resource mobility is suggested as 
an explanation for the tax smoothing differences. 
 
Section 2 looks at the theory of efficient taxation over time. A distinction 
is made between national and state and local governments. Section 3 
presents the model. Section 4 looks at the historical time series data on 
budget surpluses. Section 5 discusses the tax rate data. Section 6 examines 
two cumulated periodogram statistics to see if the first differenced tax rate 
series rejects white noise. Correction is made for using time averaged tax 
rates by filtering the data. In addition, regression tests are performed for 
federal tax rates. Section 7 summarizes the results. 
 
 
2. EFFICIENT TAXATION OVER TIME 
 
Tax smoothing results when governments set tax rates so as to minimize 
the costs of taxation over time. Given the long-run constraint of a 
balanced budget, if the marginal costs of taxation are an increasing function 
of the amount of resources taxed (i.e., the “tax rate”), then minimization of 
the total costs of taxation implies that the planned tax rate will be constant 
over time. Changes in tax rates will be unpredictable, and the tax rate will 
behave as a random walk. Deviations in government spending and output 
from their permanent levels results in deficits and surpluses. Therefore, tax 
smoothing provides a theory of government debt. The model is primarily 
due to Barro (1979). 
 
Empirical testing of the tax-smoothing hypothesis has focused on federal 
tax rates. Sahasakul (1986) examines a regression model of the U.S. 
federal tax rate based on Barro. Sahasakul rejects tax smoothing due to the 
significance of temporary government spending. A potential problem with 
Sahasakul’s test arises from the need to separate government spending into 
permanent and temporary components. One cannot tell if rejection of tax 
smoothing is due to a failure of government to smooth tax rates or an unreliable 
forecasting equation for government spending. Bizer and Durlauf 
(1990, 1991) examine the random walk implication directly. Time series analysis 
in the frequency domain is employed to see if the first differenced tax 
rate series rejects randomness, or white noise. This methodology avoids the 
need to estimate temporary and permanent government spending variables. 
Bizer and Durlauf, in general, reject the white noise hypothesis for U.S. 
federal tax rates. Barro (1981, 1986), Kochin, Benjamin, and Meador (1986), 
and Huang and Lin (1993) find general support for tax smoothing by the 
U.S. federal government. Trehan and Walsh (1988) reject tax smoothing by 
the U.S. federal government. Gupta (1992) finds evidence favoring tax 
smoothing by the Canadian federal government. Horrigan (1986) is an exception 
to the focus on only federal tax rates. Using quarterly data, Horrigan 
finds general support for Barro’s tax smoothing model when examining U.S. 
federal debt but rejects tax smoothing when examining U.S. state and local 
debt.1 
Benjamin and Kochin (1978, 1982) suggest the ability of governments 
to smooth tax rates may be restricted by the mobility of taxable resources. 
At the state and local levels, as temporary deficits and surpluses occur, mobile 
resources could seek out jurisdictions where the current benefits of 
government spending exceed the current costs. Therefore, state and local 
governments may be prevented from engaging in tax smoothing. This could 
explain the large number of balanced budget rules that exist among state 
and local governments in the U.S. Nearly every state government in the U.S. 
has a balanced budget rule. Mobility predicts such rules. 
 
Compared to the U.S., Canada’s provinces are generally larger in area 
than most states. With two official languages in use, and French being confined 
largely to Quebec, there may be less mobility of human resources in 
Canada.2 Contrary to the states, no balanced budget rules exist for the Canadian 
provinces. Canadian local governments are restricted in the amount 
of debt they may issue, as all local debt proposals must be approved by the 
province. 
 
This study extends the work of Bizer and Durlauf primarily in two 
ways. First, the methodology is applied to Canada. Second, the methodology 
is used to see if tax smoothing differs by the level of government. 
 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
The model assumes a government budget identity in period t as 
follows: 
 
 (1) 
 
where Gt is real total government expenditures, excluding interest on the 
public debt, r is the real rate of interest, and Bt is the real stock of public 
debt outstanding at the end of time period t. Yt is real output, and st is the 
“tax rate.” stYt equals real total tax revenue collected at time t, or Tt. After 
dividing terms in Equation (1) by real output, an intertemporal budget constraint 
can be derived as follows: 
 
 (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. BUDGET SURPLUS TIME SERIES 
 
This section examines the historical time series data on budget surpluses 
in Canada and the U.S. at all levels of government. The historical data 
suggest that both federal governments and the Canadian provinces smooth 
tax rates but that state and local governments do not. 
 
When examining deficits for evidence of tax smoothing, a more valid 
measure of debt to examine at the state/provincial and local levels would be 
debt incurred from current, or non-capital, expenditures. Resource mobility 
would limit state/provincial and local governments in their means of finance. 
If large capital projects were financed with current taxes, mobile resources 
could move into the area after the tax was paid by the current residents. The 
mobile resources could then realize the benefits of capital spending without 
bearing the costs. With mobility, state/provincial and local levels of government 
would be expected to finance capital expenditures with debt. Therefore, 
capital expenditures will be excluded from measures of provincial/state 
and local government deficits shown below. 
 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of federal government budget surplus 
ratios. The behavior of deficits and surpluses is similar in both countries. 
The Depression years of the 1930s have mostly budget deficits. The World 
War II years are characterized by large deficits followed by surpluses afterwards. 
The recessions of 1975 and 1982 show marked increases in relative 
deficits. The large post-1983 deficits appear unusual and imply future budget 
surpluses under tax smoothing. Overall, Figure 1 suggests that both countries 
are likely engaged in tax smoothing at the federal level. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show aggregate current budget surplus ratios for state, 
provincial, and local governments. U.S. state and local budget surplus ratios 
are shown with and without their social insurance fund surplus. The social 
insurance surplus, incurred primarily from pension funds of government 
workers, can distort the overall budget surplus data. It appears that state and 
local governments are not tax smoothing. Their budgets remain relatively 
stable and at a surplus, with or without the social insurance fund. Contrary 
to this, examination suggests the Canadian provinces may be tax smoothing. 
We see more variation in provincial surpluses and deficits. Both Canada and 
the U.S. experienced recessions in 1975 and 1982, but only the Canadian 
provinces realized deficits for these years. State and local government budget 
surpluses remained relatively unchanged. The above suggests that provincial 
governments are more likely engaged in tax smoothing than state and local 
governments.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. TAX RATE DATA 
 
The average or proportional tax rate series will be examined in both 
Canada and the U.S. at each level of government. The average tax rate is 
calculated as total tax revenue divided by GDP for Canada and by GNP for 
the U.S. To compare the results here with those of others, the “marginal tax 
rate” will also be examined at the federal levels. 
Some revenue collected by governments may be considered as nontax 
revenue. Such revenue could occur if government sells, rents, or leases any 
assets it owns. This revenue is not a tax per se, since people are paying for 
the use of a government owned asset. Government transfer revenue to the 
provincial/state and local governments is also a type of nontax revenue. There 
is no reason why tax-smoothing behavior should occur for nontax revenue; 
therefore, to examine the tax smoothing hypothesis more accurately, nontax 
revenue will be subtracted from total revenue when feasible. 
 
A consistent time series of separate U.S. state and local taxes and output 
is unavailable before 1959. Therefore, the 1929–1990 combined series 
will be employed for testing. There is some question as to the inclusion of 
social insurance collections in tax receipts. The key point is whether incremental 
social insurance revenue collected by the government can be considered 
a tax. Boskin and Puffert (1987) simulate the net benefits from social 
insurance contributions for various groups in the U.S. and find that for a 
large part of working households the incremental benefit is less than the 
incremental tax. For some individuals, social insurance contributions can be 
considered a pure tax. Rea (1981) finds that large segments of the Canadian 
working population can expect to receive little extra benefits from their Canada 
Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan contributions. The above studies 
provide evidence to suggest that social insurance revenue can be considered 
largely as a tax. Therefore, this study will include social insurance collections 
in all measures of total tax receipts.4 
 
The theory of optimal taxation over time is really a theory concerned 
with equalizing marginal excess burdens over time. A marginal cost of taxation 
function which is constant over time implies a uniform marginal rate 
of taxation over time. Sahasakul and Gupta test models using estimates of 
the “marginal tax rate” for the U.S. and Canadian federal governments respectively. 
Except for the income tax, most taxes can be described as average 
or proportional. Which tax rate is preferable in empirical testing? First, the 
“marginal tax rates” employed by Sahasakul and Gupta are calculated as 
averages of marginal income tax rates, in addition to other, proportional, 
taxes. Second, tax deductions can change at the margin. Marginal changes 
in income tax deductions are not included in the average marginal tax rate 
but are included in the average tax rate. Therefore, it is not clear which 
measure of the tax rate is preferable for testing. For comparison, both average 
and “marginal tax rates” will be examined at the federal levels.5 
 
 
 
6. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
 
Time series analysis in the frequency domain is undertaken for the first 
differenced tax rate to test for significant departure from white noise. Tax 
smoothing implies that the first differenced tax rate resembles a white noise 
process. Two cumulated periodogram statistics are estimated to see if the 
shape of the sample spectral distribution function differs from white noise. 
This approach was suggested in Bizer and Durlauf (1990). Correction for 
the use of first differenced averages is made by filtering the data. Regression 
tests are also performed for federal tax rates. Results generally support tax 
smoothing by both federal governments and the Canadian provinces but 
reject tax smoothing by state and local governments. 
 
The theoretical spectral density f (λ) of a white noise process is equal 
at all frequencies and can be described as follows: 
 
 (6) 
 
where k is the frequency of the cycle, and σ2 is the variance of the first 
differenced time series. Estimates of the spectral density at a particular frequency 
have been shown to give results that are unbiased but not consistent.6 
As well, even if the sample is truly random, occasional large random deviations, 
or cycles, could show up as a significant spike in the spectral density. 
A cumulated periodogram test was suggested as a test of the martingale 
hypothesis in Bizer and Durlauf. Contrary to the spectral density at individual 
frequencies, the cumulated deviations of the white noise spectral density 
converge to zero (e.g., Durlauf 1991). Since the cumulated periodogram test 
examines all frequencies, the test is valid for all implications of the white 
noise null hypothesis and is equivalent to examining all autocorrelations in 
the time domain. 
 
Under the white noise null hypothesis, the shape of the spectral density 
would be a rectangle, implying that the spectral distribution function is 
shaped as a diagonal line. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
cumulated deviations from the white noise diagonal are too large to be considered 
sampling error. Two cumulated periodogram “goodness-of-fit” 
statistics are examined here: the Cramer-von Mises statistic and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.7 
 
A potential problem with estimating the autocorrelations of a first differenced 
time series has been noted in Working (1960). If averages are 
constructed from sets of random numbers, the autocorrelations of the first 
differences will give misleading results. ut will be a first-order moving average 
as follows: 
 
and 
 
 (7) 
 
Given the above, the correlation between ut and ut_1 would be as follows: 
 
 (8) 
 
where n is the number of observations in each average. The first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient of ut equals 0.25 as n approaches infinity.8 
 
How important might the time averaging effect be? In a world of zero 
costs, tax smoothing could imply continuous smoothing as new information 
about the future path of permanent government spending and output became 
available. Since major tax rate changes entail significant costs, such 
changes generally occur not more than once a year. In some years a major 
tax rate change has occurred twice.9 Therefore, the proper correction for 
time averaging appears to be either no correction at all or a correction for 
two tax rate changes per year. 
 
Correction for time averaging can be made by employing a filter on 
the first differenced tax rate series. The correct filter is a forward filter using 
the partial correlations of the theoretical first differenced series. This filter 
was suggested in Hayashi and Sims (1983).10 Given two random sequences 
in each average, or n _ 2 in Equation (8), the theoretical autocorrelation 
coefficient of the first differenced series at lag one would be 0.167. The filter 
would be as follows: 
 
 (9) 
 
where the infinite autoregressive process is approximated by the terms to t 
+ 3.11 
 
The Cramer-von Mises and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov cumulated periodogram 
statistics were estimated as follows. Results are shown in Table 1, 
with and without correction for time averaging given two tax rate changes 
per year. 
 
 
 
 
Average tax rate results support tax smoothing by the U.S. federal 
government. The Canadian federal and provincial results are sensitive to 
adjustment for time averaging. After correction for time averaging, results 
support tax smoothing. Results clearly reject tax smoothing by state and local 
governments. The strongest rejection is at the local level. 
 
The U.S. federal average tax rate results differ from those reported in 
Bizer and Durlauf. The difference is due to the data in the samples tested. 
Bizer and Durlauf reject the random walk implication using average tax rate 
data for the periods 1879–1986 and 1879–1945.12 The 1929–1990 sample 
period used in this study may be more appropriate for testing the tax smoothing 
hypothesis because tax receipts are measured on an accrual basis. Tax 
receipts were measured on a cash basis only prior to 1929. 
The federal “marginal tax rate” results are less favorable towards tax 
smoothing. U.S. federal government results reject tax smoothing, with or 
without adjustment for time averaging. The Canadian federal government 
results are sensitive to adjustment for time averaging. Before adjustment, 
the Canadian results are unable to reject tax smoothing. After adjusting for 
time averaging, the Canadian results reject tax smoothing. As noted earlier, 
it is not clear whether the average or “marginal tax rate” measure is preferred 
for testing. Therefore, the above results do not provide a clear answer to the 
question of whether or not federal tax rates reject tax smoothing. 
 
To examine federal tax rates further, regression tests were undertaken 
to see if tax rate changes are unpredictable. Tax smoothing implies that tax 
rate changes will be unpredictable from past information. First differenced 
federal average and marginal tax rates were regressed on their own lagged 
values, lagged ratios of government spending to output, and lagged real 
output growth. Lags of one to four years were employed. Testing was undertaken 
with and without correction for time averaging. Filtered variables 
were used as described in Equation (9) for the first differenced tax rate, 
given two tax rate changes per year. Other variables were adjusted with a 
similar filter, except where n approaches infinity. Instrumental variables 
were employed as suggested in Hayashi and Sims. As an additional test, time 
averaging was also corrected by omitting the lag-one variables. This method 
of correcting for time averaging was suggested in Barro (1981). Results are 
shown in Table 2. For federal average tax rates, only two out of twelve lagged 
variables were significant for each country, at the 5% level. For federal marginal 
tax rates, no lagged variables were significant in the U.S. case, while 
only two out of twelve lagged variables were significant for Canada, at the 
5% level. After adjusting for time averaging by filtering the data, no lagged 
variables were significant at the 5% level for either tax rate in Canada or the 
U.S. After adjusting for time averaging by omitting lag-one variables, only 
one variable was significant at the 5% level for each tax rate measure in 
Canada. No variables were significant for the U.S. An advantage of the above 
tests is the lack of necessity to separate permanent from temporary government 
spending. The Canadian results generally support those of Gupta, 
which could not reject tax smoothing using federal marginal tax rates. The 
U.S. results are opposite to those reached by Sahasakul. The difference may 
 
be due to the difficulties involved in separating permanent from temporary 
government spending in Sahasakul’s test.13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data aggregated from all provinces, states, or local governments were 
used in the tests reported in Table 1. If these governments are not tax 
smoothing, but adjusting tax rates each period in response to current conditions, 
it is possible that aggregating data from all provinces, states, or local 
governments could give the appearance of tax smoothing.14 This could occur 
if, for example, some governments increase tax rates at the same time other 
governments reduce them. This could be the reason the (filtered) provincial 
tax rate series does not reject tax smoothing. To examine the tax smoothing 
hypothesis more carefully, tax rate data for each province will be examined. 
Data on taxes and output by province are available only since 1961, resulting 
in reduced sample size and power compared to the aggregate tests. Since 
the Cramer-von Mises statistic was earlier suggested to have high power 
even in small samples, it was estimated here for each province. Testing was 
undertaken with and without correction for the effect of time averaging from 
two tax rate changes per year. Results are shown in Table 3. In general, the 
results support those shown earlier. Only one province, Prince Edward Is- 
land, rejects the tax smoothing null hypothesis of white noise at the 5% level 
in the unadjusted test. After adjusting for the effect of time averaging, two 
provinces, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, reject the white noise null 
hypothesis at the 5% level.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The tax-smoothing theory was examined at all levels of government in 
Canada and the U.S. Historical budget surplus data suggested that federal 
and provincial governments were tax smoothing, but state and local governments 
were not. Tax smoothing was examined by testing the null hypothesis 
of white noise in the first differenced tax rate series. Time series analysis in 
the frequency domain was undertaken by examining two cumulated periodogram 
statistics. Estimation was performed with and without correction for 
time averaging. At the federal levels, both average and marginal tax rates 
were examined. Average tax rates generally support tax smoothing by both 
federal governments and the Canadian provinces. The Canadian federal and 
provincial results were sensitive to adjustment for time averaging. Contrary 
to the federal and provincial results, tax smoothing was clearly rejected for 
state and local governments. The difference between federal and local governments 
was the strongest result found. In addition to average tax rates, 
“marginal tax rates” were examined at the federal levels. Marginal tax rate 
time series results generally reject tax smoothing for both federal governments. 
The Canadian results were sensitive to adjustment for time averaging. 
Regression tests were undertaken for federal average and marginal tax rates 
to examine the null hypothesis that tax rate changes are unpredictable. In 
general, regression tests could not reject the null hypothesis of tax smoothing 
in either country. Differences in resource mobility was suggested as an explanation 
for the tax smoothing differences between the states and provinces, 
and for greater tax smoothing by federal than by local governments. 
 
NOTES 
1. There are potential problems with Horrigan’s test. First, Horrigan uses time trends to estimate 
trend real GNP and trend real government expenditures. If real output and real government 
expenditures are nonstationary, their regression on time may lead to spurious regressions. 
Second, Horrigan does not distinguish between current and capital debt. Such a 
distinction may be important for state and local governments, as resource mobility encourages 
these governments to finance capital expenditures with debt. 
2. It is also interesting to note that until recently, with Canada’s 1982 constitution, provinces 
were in some cases able to deny employment to workers from other provinces. The constitution 
now denies this except under more limited circumstances. 
3. Although nearly every U.S. state has a balanced budget rule, this does not rule out tax 
smoothing. State governments could still smooth taxes by varying the size of their surpluses. 
4. This author performed tests similar to those here, but omitting social insurance revenue. 
The results were identical to those reported here in terms of significance levels, and with little 
change in quantitative estimates. Results are available upon request. 
 
5. Estimates of the marginal tax rate are not available for state/provincial and local 
governments. 
6. The variance does not depend on the sample size and does not go to zero as the sample 
size 
increases. 
 
7. Bernard and Durlauf (1990) provide evidence that the power of the Cramer-von Mises 
statistic is high, even in samples as small as 40 observations. For further discussion of these 
statistics as tests of the martingale hypothesis see Durlauf (1991). 
8. First differences of averages composed from a set of random numbers will leave 
autocorrelations at lags higher than one unchanged. 
9. Major tax rate changes generally occur only once or twice a year in Canada and the U.S., at 
all levels of government (e.g., Firestone 1960; Pechman 1987; and Strick 1985). 
 
10. See Hall (1988) and Haug (1991) for additional applications of the filter. 
 
11. The partial correlations used in the filter can be calculated after knowing the theoretical 
correlation coefficient at lag one is 0.167. 
12. They are unable to reject the white noise null hypothesis for the period 1946–1986. 
13. Strazicich (1996) performs regression tests for state and provincial governments using panel 
data. Results support tax smoothing by provincial governments, but reject tax smoothing by 
state governments. 
14. This possibility was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
15. Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics were also estimated for each province, with and without 
correction for time averaging. None of the estimates reject the white noise null at the 5% level 
of significance. Results are available from the author upon request. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Data Definitions and Sources 
Canada: Data comes from the CANSIM data base, Statistics Canada, 
and are part of the National Income and Expenditure Accounts of Canada, 
1926–90. 
 
Federal 
Tax revenue is total revenue minus nontax revenue. Nontax revenue 
includes “interest on loans, advances and investments” to crown corporations, 
“remittances from government business enterprises,” and “royalties” 
from natural resource ownership. Marginal tax rate data, 1947–84, comes 
from Gupta (1992). 
 
Figure 1: Budget surplus is total revenue minus total expenditures. 
Figures include the Canada pension plan (CPP) surplus. The CPP was 
started in 1966. 
 
Provincial 
Tax revenue is total revenue minus nontax revenue. Nontax revenue 
is the same as for the federal government except that it also includes “profits 
from liquor commissions” and “transfers from the federal government.” 
Quebec’s tax revenue includes revenue from the Quebec Pension Plan 
(QPP). 
 
Figure 2: Current budget surplus is total revenue minus total current 
spending. Current spending excludes spending on “fixed capital and inventories,” 
but includes current depreciation of capital. Surplus excludes QPP 
surplus. The QPP started in 1966, and Quebec is the only province that does 
not participate in the national pension plan. Inclusion of the QPP surplus 
might distort the significance of the aggregate provincial government surplus 
figures and is therefore omitted from Figure 2. 
 
Local 
Tax revenue is total revenue minus nontax revenue. Nontax revenue 
includes “investment income” and “federal and provincial transfers.” 
Figure 3: Current budget surplus is total revenue minus total current 
spending, as described above. 
 
United States: Data comes from the National Income and Product 
Accounts, 1982 edition, for the years 1929–82 and from the Survey of Current 
Business, various editions, 1983–90, unless otherwise noted. 
Federal 
Tax revenue is total revenue minus nontax revenue. Nontax revenue 
includes various “fees, fines, donations, rents and royalties.” Tax revenue 
includes social insurance revenue. Marginal tax rate data, 1938–82, comes 
from Sahasakul (1986). 
 
Figure 1: Budget surplus is total revenue minus total spending, including 
the social insurance fund surplus. 
 
State and Local 
Tax revenue is total revenue minus nontax revenue. Nontax revenue 
is the same as for the federal government, except it also includes transfers 
from the federal government, or “Federal grants-in-aid.” 
 
Figures 2 and 3: Current budget surplus figures for state and local 
governments exclude capital spending on “structures.” Figures are shown 
with and without the social insurance fund surplus. Data come from the 
Department of Commerce and are available upon request. 
 
 
 
